Jun 2008 16

The Ministry of Defence: In need of urgent reform.1

Britain’s policy of ‘liberal interventionism over the past decade has asked a lot of our Armed forces. One would expect that a government intent on using their Armed Forces, would also be one that appreciated the necessity of investment and considered governance.

This has not been the case however. Much needed increases in the defence budget – to compensate for the increases in military operations – have failed to appear, and governance of the existing defence budget by the MOD so lamentable that for many it seems as if defence spending has actually been cut. The situation is such that men like General Sir Richard Dannatt now air their concerns over low pay, poor accommodation and lack of general respect shown towards the armed forces – by both the public and government – openly, a new phenomenon.

But as a result airing these concerns, General Dannatt will it appears, be passed over for the job of Chief of the Defence Staff. The Sunday Times reported General Dannatt’s recent comments he made him powerful enemies in the Labour party.

And this is symptomatic of a wider problem at the Ministry of Defence, where the people who actually know about defence, those in the armed forces, are bound by politicians and civil servants. Problems arise when civil servants who have little experience of the defence environment, and with politicians who rarely stay long enough at the Ministry to Defence to understand the complex nature of defence, are asked to make decisions on major issues with long term strategic importance.

The nature of these long term decisions demands a greater role for the armed forces in the processes of the MOD. While the elected and democratically accountable Minster should set the strategic culture, much more should be left to those who have the knowledge and experience to that strategic view into reality. Moreover, allowing the armed forces a greater role in the ministry of defence’s administration would also allow more immediate and acceptable responses to situation’s such as poor housing and pay.

What is becoming clear is that the armed forces are uneasy about how they are being treated by politicians and civil servants. If the government is going to continue to want an effective armed force, they need to incorporate those who understand the needs and processes of the armed forces much more closely. Freezing out men such as General Dannatt because what they say is politically inconvenient will do nothing to convince people that the government is committed to those who literally lay down their lives in the pursuit of government policy.

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  • http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com Richard North

    Your arguments might be more convincing if your enthusiasm for Dannatt was matched by convincing arguments for the projects he favours.
    For instance, Dannatt is an ethusiastic advocate for the FRES programme, with the utility vehicle alone estimated at £6 billion – a programme with highly dubious application to current operations.
    Yet this is also the man who has shown no enthusiasm for the protected vehicle programme, where the costs are significantly lower and the utility well proven in action.
    Underlying your argument, there seems to be an assumption that “military good” – “politicians bad”, yet if you look at the some decisions made by the military (as above) you will see that, in some cases, the poltical judgement has been better than that of the military.
    If anything, therefore, better procurement requires more not less political input – for instance, with the Defence Committee being involved in decisions before rather than after equipment is selected.
    On the other hand, if you are advocating that Generals should have a greater say in the “toys” they buy, then perhaps you would also concede that they should pay for them as well out of their own well-lined pockets.