There is an option; there is a choice; and the people know it.
A reader kindly draws our attention to a useful poll recently commissioned through YouGov.
The polling figures are large enough to have a narrow margin of error. The question is expressed clearly enough to be intelligible. Crucially, the wording is set out in a way not to deliberately encourage the individual to lean towards one particular response.
What is that question? In an abbreviated nutshell, which would be a better bet for the UK – membership of the EU, or membership of EFTA?
If anything, the costs ascribed to the EFTA option are too high, and the EU costs too low (even referencing just the direct costs). Yet that skews the answer towards the EU model. Moreover, the question assumes that just one alternative model exists beyond the EU, and doesn’t explore the prospect of continuing trade with EU countries for an EU country that has sought a vastly looser arrangement – a rainbow of EFTA-style deals. So the drafter was quite generous with his wording.
But these simplicities are necessary for a quick question of binary choice, and draw us away from the remarkable findings.
Although only a third of respondents had heard of EFTA (and therefore already had an understanding of other trade models in Europe), once the outline of the two organisations had been explained to them, more respondents preferred the EFTA approach than the EU model, while a remarkable one in four were ‘don’t knows’.
For an organisation like the EU that has been in the British public consciousness for the past 35 years, that’s quite a blow.
It also shows that there is more to the EU debate than simply being “against Brussels”, and that there are genuine options on offer with the prospect of popular backing.
The one statistic that those supporting the current type of EU linkage can point to is the very high number of supporters amongst those of student age (although as a subgroup, here the polling figures are liable to a much higher margin of error, and other polls with lower margins have seen the figures much closer). Then again, it is a specific target audience for the hundreds of millions of Euros of propaganda funds spent on winning over the Youth of Europe every year. No doubt the Commission would now see this as confirmation of PR money well spent.
You can find the original data here: http://www.yougov.co.uk/extranets/ygarchives/content/pdf/HugovanRandwyck(EFTA).pdf, courtesy of http://www.uk-efta.net/. It’s a useful piece of commissioning and well worth a ponder.
In the light of the reported use of British passports by Mossad, the Prime Minister strikes a strident tone. "A British passport is an important part of being British," he declares.
Would this be the same passport that has been allowed since 1988 to shift into a communal trans-European burgundy red? The official document with the words "European Union" prominently heading up the front cover for over a decade now?
And would these be the same passports our friends in Brussels are still tinkering with in order to sell the benefits of EU membership to "European citizens" (see this story here, which we originally uncovered – http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-565510/British-tourists-told-EU-stickers-passports.html, over which an embarrassed British government swiftly rowed back)?
Just wondering.
The wires have beaten me to it in any event, but readers will I hope allow the occasional migration from the EU into the global, particularly one with a relevance to the current crisis in Greece.
Last night, the think tank Politeia hosted economist and commentator Irwin Steltzer, on loan for the evening from Washington’s Hudson Institute (delayed somewhat by the wintry conditions in the capital of late: apparently the Mayor, when challenged what is plan of action was, indicated that he was waiting for Spring). His discursions on the state of Athens and of London were of interest, but as Business Week quite rightly flags up today, the real twist came in the questions session at the end.
Challenged what he would do in the place of an incoming Prime Minister after the elections, he jumped straight in: "Call in the IMF".
That organisation carries no domestic baggage, no sentimentalities, and no democratic responsibilities either.
It was a perceptive response, not because there is a lack of anyone capable of fixing the deficit and getting to grips with the banana republic levels of public spending and debt – the Canadian experience shows us that it can be done. But British politics has become so polluted with fear of cutting down on unaffordable levels of ‘bread and games’ that there is no will, barely enough even to debate the issue seriously in public. Whichever politician dares to tell the truth will be chastised as the hospital trolley candidate. In turn, there is little appetite for any future minister grabbing that ivory handled revolver.
Thanks to simplistic appeals and live wire allegations over many long years, politicians are afraid of massive public sector reform, even where failing to cut the addictions of the past will now clearly lead to utter ruin. Career trumps country, and pending disaster is barricaded away in a closet. The fate of Frank Field shows this all too painfully. As Seltzer also pointed out, the growth of the state over the past few decades has been so massive as to be approaching irredeemable, and the starting posts have shifted vastly.
In any case, an appeal to the IMF is a concept that is a stage too far, but it speaks to a basic truth. Are we come so far that the country needs a scapegoat to rescue itself?
Oh dear, oh dear! Self-interest strikes again.
A few months ago, we published research into the track records of British MEPs, and then ranked them. These things as we noted at the time are relative and to some extent subjective, but it proved a useful starting point for voters to challenge individuals up for re-election on the doorstep, and explore how they had voted on taxpayer-unfriendly roll call votes.
Judging from the latest reports emerging from Brussels, some of those rankings will have to be seriously revisited next time round.
MEPs have long been able to benefit from a ridiculous second pension scheme, allowing them matched funding to feather their retirement nest beyond their generous first pension. Today’s Telegraph reveals that at least 36 British MEPs are covered by the fund, plus a number of others who have since retired.
Just like ExpensesGate in the British Parliament, such grants are perfectly legal, but even a moment’s reflection would bring cause to reflect whether they were financially moral. The option to join the scheme is, after all, exactly that: an option. The scheme is voluntary. The incentive to join is driven only by self-interest, at public expense.
Four Conservative MEPs are reportedly involved in a legal challenge, demanding the scheme’s funding black hole be filled. Thanks to a failed attempt by some to maintain the anonymity of those involved in the case, the British MEPs have been named as Sir Robert Atkins, Giles Chichester, Roger Helmer, and Robert Sturdy.
Of course, while they are the active ones it may well be that a large number of more politically astute colleagues are quietly hoping that they will succeed, mutely willing reform to founder. Official party lines are that the taxpayer shouldn’t bail out the astonishing £106 million deficit. In this, they are correct. But it beggars belief that even after the shattering public outcry over expenses with MPs, some of our representatives still do not "get it", and fail to read the signs that the gravy train is about to hit the buffers.
Is Greece set to unravel the Euro? The dynamics of that undynamic public administration look set to have a crucial impact, but not necessarily in the way people are expecting.
Successful currency zones operate where safety valves operate to take the strain that a floating exchange rate would normally channel. Having the same currency as your export partners obviously does not allow for your national currency to depreciate under the market’s direction, allowing for exports to become more competitive on an exchange level. So a Eurozone country that is heavily reliant on inter-Eurozone trade cannot benefit from an export-led drive from recession in the way that Britain’s has. Heaven help us indeed if we had joined the Euro under Blair after all.
Instead, countries have to rely on social or financial shifts. Consider the case of, say, Merseyside (as a ‘Woollyback’ by origin I feel safe raising the analogy). Imagine – it’s not hard to do – there is a period of regional decline due to a shift in national and global trade patterns. Liverpool is in the same currency area as London, and so cannot offset a local recession through a depreciation of its currency compared with the London Pound. The cost of making a product in the Wirral does not become comparatively cheaper once it is sent down the M6, because the currency rate is fixed.
However, in compensation, since Liverpool and London are in the same country, and the national government recognises that there is an economic and social crisis, the state transfers money from the central budget into the area to support development, encourage shifts in employment, and bear the brunt of high unemployment. That is the price and the benefit of accepting currency union, based on the geographical redistribution of the take from a common tax system.
The other main alternative is for people to move away and look for work in areas lacking the necessary workforce. This of course is easier in countries where there is a common language and a common culture – the United States is a classic example, with an extraordinarily high ratio of movements of people both infra- and inter-state every year.
The problem with Greece and the EU, however, is that these principles do not apply to the same extent. The ‘federal’ EU budget is a tiny fraction of the federal budget of the United States. Meanwhile, despite a burst of considerable migration during the accession of several Eastern European states to the EU, there does not seem to be the same level of work fluidity in the Greek marketplace and certainly nothing approaching North American levels.
Where does this leave the Euro today? The Commission has apparently already suggested that Athens will come under ‘special measures’. Why anyone should express surprise or outrage within the Eurozone is a mystery; such a development was always inevitable, and pointed out by critics even at the time. At some point, with divergent economies cobbled together on the basis of political exigence and ideological aspiration, an economic crisis would hit one part of the currency union more than another. In the absence of all the customary safety valves, the call would come for Brussels to step in to do more.
It’s no coincidence after all that the Lisbon Treaty establishes on a legal footing, for the first time, another barely-known leadership post; the President of the Eurozone (see the Protocol on the Euro Group here: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0153:0153:EN:PDF).
If you like, it’s the prototype for a Euro-Chancellor to go with the EU President and the EU Foreign Minister. Expect the importance of that post to grow swiftly.
We can also anticipate a growing backlash from trades unions and the Left against Brussels as emergency measures are touted; and also increased wariness amongst non-Euro countries to sign on the dotted line.
But above all, as the crisis deepens, the lesson from the past five years is that the planners and legislators in Brussels will call for more powers and more integration. Problems generate solutions made in Brussels and the European Central Bank’s home at Frankfurt. They will turn increasingly to the financial and fiscal models of other federal states across the world, to correct the imperfections of their federal currency. One might suggest cynically that this was the measure all along, with politicians refusing to admit to a greater project than their electorates at the time of Maastricht would have swallowed.
Perhaps this is the very moment that a two-tier European Union becomes set in concrete, with the ‘ins’ now consenting to the administrative forms needed to make their currency work in a crisis, and the ‘outs’ finding the step to currency union to have become too much of a bound.
The cost certainly will be heavy. For the British taxpayer, and regardless of the government in power in Westminster, the further we are out, the less burned we will be.
By a remarkable symmetry, two stories have today been breaking relating to opposite ends of the same piece of policy string.
The House of Bishops’ Europe Panel is the EU grouping of the Anglican Lords Spiritual. Today’s Telegraph carries a story highlighting an unusually critical report by the group. Well, these things are contextual. But what certainly leaps out is the following passage;
The European institutional public sphere is largely a public discourse for elites, it is a sphere in which citizens remain uninvolved. This has in turn contributed to the EU’s democratic deficit. Rather than seeing social partners and civil society as important stakeholders merely in the implementation of EU 2020, the European Commission needs to relax the terms of the debate so enabling them to be critical partners in the shaping and reshaping of the vision underpinning this document. The solutions to today’s challenges must come from society if they are to meet people’s needs. Europe’s citizens have to be placed more squarely at the centre of the agenda.